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Abstract
I study the role the agent’s wealth plays in the principal-agent matching
with moral hazard and limited liability. I consider wealth and talent as the
agent’s type, and size as the firm’s (principal’s) type. Because utility is not
perfectly transferable in this setup, I use generalized increasing differences and
find that wealthier agents match with bigger firms, when talent is homoge-
neous among them, whereas for equally wealthy agents, more talented agents
will match with bigger firms. I describe economic conditions over types such
that pairs of higher types will write contracts in which the agent obtains more
than the information rents, through a higher bonus, increasing the expected
surplus. Finally, I provide an example in which wealth is distributed among
agents in such a way that it reverses the standard result of positive assortative
matching between talent and firm size.
JEL-Classification: D86, D82, C78, J33, M12.
Keywords: Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, Matching, Non Transfer-
able Utility.
1 Introduction
Wealth can play a major role in the design of optimal incentives, and there-
fore in the matching between principals and agents. In order to study the
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compensation of these agents, it is fundamental to understand how they will
endogenously match with the firms they end up working for,1 and the specific
role that the characteristics of the contracting parties play in it. I propose a
model in which risk neutral agents, characterized by their wealth and talent,
match with firms (principals), characterized by their size, to perform a task
and in the presence of moral hazard. This model allows to study the contracts
being signed by the parties, and the implications that wealth brings to the
matching for the traditional results of positive assortative matching between
talented agents and bigger firms.
Wealth can affect the agent’s behavior, and the optimal contract, in two
different ways: through the agent’s risk aversion or through limited liability.
While the scarce literature studying the effects in compensation focused on
the former (Chade and de Serio, 2014, Thiele and Wambach, 1999), this article
concentrates on the latter. Limited liability prevents the principal from selling
a high participation in the company to the agent in order to achieve an output
closer to the one without information asymmetries.2 Having this in mind,
I raise the question: How do principals and agents match? In particular:
Do wealthier agents match with larger firms or the opposite? Can wealth
and talent be assigned to agents in such a way that the positive assortative
matching of talented agents working in bigger companies does not hold?
Even though the empirical literature studying the matching between prin-
cipals and agents has focused on the agent’s talent as the main driver, wealth,
through limited liability, can play a major role.3 It is a standard result in the
moral hazard literature that under asymmetric information the principal can
achieve the first best level of effort with a risk neutral agent that is not cash
constrained, allowing the principal to define negative transfers to the agent
in case of bad outcomes, or as the traditional interpretation indicates, an up-
front cash payment from the agent to the principal. This can be observed
for example in the franchise model, or in the cab business. This scenario is
not common in the corporate world (see Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988)).
This can be due to the lack of wealth from the agents to make the transfers,
legal or social limitations, or it can be simply interpreted in a different man-
1Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) shows the pervasive effects of neglecting the endogenous match-
ing when studying incentive contracts empirically.
2Shetty (1988) studied the effect that limited liability has on the contracts between tenants and
landlords.
3Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006), to my knowledge, is the only that explicitly considered the
role of wealth in a traditional principal-agent matching setup. However, they consider homogeneous
principals, while I allow for heterogeneous principals. I also allow for agents to differ in talent.
Legros and Newman (1996) considers a problem of matching agents of the same type with different
wealth levels, that get together to form firms between them. Wealth plays an important role in
this.
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ner, for example as an obligation for the executives to buy shares from the
company. Other professions do face these kind of contracts more explicitly.
For example, lawyers, when promoted to partners, must buy their partnership
with money from their own pockets. Physicians, in some countries, must buy
a participation in the clinics where they receive their patients. In general any
kind of partnership will involve transfers from the agents to the principal.
As mentioned, in the absence of limited liability the principal can set up a
contract that achieves a first best outcome, by selling the firm to the agent for
the whole expected surplus leaving the agent without any information rents.
This is no longer true once the agent is cash constrained. I focus my study
on how this channel affects the matching between agents and principals. In
a first stage I study the isolated version of the principal-agent model, finding
that the principal’s utility increases in matches with wealthier agents, whereas
the agent’s utility increases by working in bigger firms. This suggests that a
positive assortative matching is to be expected, that is wealthier agents should
work in bigger firms.
Because utility is not perfectly transferable in the principal-agent model, as
the sharing of the surplus affects the strength of the incentives, it is necessary
to use the concept of generalized increasing differences, introduced by Legros
and Newman (2007), in order to analyze the matching. Doing so, requires
to study carefully the utility possibility frontier (UPF) that arises from the
model. After doing that, I find that there is positive assortative matching
(PAM) between principals and agents where the types for principal is the
firm size, and the agents’ is their wealth. The same PAM is valid when the
agents’ type is their talent: more talented agents work for bigger firms.
Then I describe the contracts that each pair will sign and the expected
output they will produce. I also consider gains in efficiency (by generating
contracts closer to the first best for some matches) that are generated by the
market pressure introduced by competition, that is, the fact that other prin-
cipals could offer more convenient contracts to my own agent. In particular, I
provide conditions under which high-type principals give larger incentives to
their agents than what they give in the isolated version of the model. For this
market pressure to be effective, though, firms should have similar sizes.
Finally I give an example in which a wealthy agent has lower skills than
a poor one, a situation in which generalized increasing differences may not
hold anymore, and therefore, neither needs to hold the positive assortative
matching between principals and agents when considering talent as the agent’s
type. This situation can be less rare as expected, as if talent is similar, the
correlation between talent and wealth can be less clear. This situation can
also apply to agents in the beginning of their careers. As a consequence, the
assumptions made on the correlation between wealth and talent are critical to
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claim that, for example, there is positive assortative matching between bigger
companies and more talented agents.
In Section 2 I describe and solve the baseline principal-agent model I use
in this article, to proceed with the analysis of the utility possibility frontier
and the matching analysis in Section 3. In Section 4 I provide an example of
a distribution of wealth and talent in which the positive assortative matching
does not hold. Finally, in Section 5 I present a discussion on how this model
fits the literature, to conclude in Section 6.
2 The Principal-Agent Framework
In this section I develop a slightly modified version of the classical model of
moral hazard with risk neutral agents.4 The modifications I introduce allow
to capture the effects of different levels of cash constraint for the agent and the
size of the firm in the optimal compensation scheme and welfare allocation,
by parameterizing the model in the firm’s size, agent’s wealth, and the agent’s
talent.
Both principal and agent are assumed to be risk neutral. I assume that
the firm’s output x can have two states, x ∈ {0, ξ}, where ξ ∈ [0, 1] reflects the
firm’s size.5 The agent’s effort e can be chosen between 0 and 1, and affects
positively the probability of success — having x = ξ as the outcome — in
the following way: Pr(x = ξ|e) = p(e) = e.6 Let a and b be the base wage
and the bonus respectively. Although a is paid independently of the outcome,
b is paid by the principal only if x = ξ is observed. Effort is costly for the
agent, and is represented by the cost function c(e) = e2/(2τ). Here τ ∈ (0, 1)
measures the ability - or talent - of the agent: a higher τ implies lower effort
cost. Assume that the reservation utility for principal and agent are 0 and
u respectively.7 Let u be the maximum between 0 and whatever he can get
by working somewhere else. Also assume that the agent has personal wealth
ω ≥ 0. The agent’s cash constraint is therefore determined by −ω, meaning
4See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Laffont and Martimort (2002), and Salanie´ (2005) for
examples.
5Considering ξ as a parameter allows to use it as firm size. For example in Gabaix and Landier
(2008), the authors mention that variables such as earnings or capitalization can be considered as
firm size, and Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2015) consider the number of employees as firm
size. Given the characteristics of this single-period model, defining size as the earnings in the good
state avoids the inclusion of more variables that would needlessly complicate the model.
6The parameterization of the model in the other variables makes the constraint for effort, to be
lower than 1, not binding.
7By the nature of the problem, I consider the reservation utility for the agent to be the minimum
change in utility he is willing to accept. Note that if the reservation utility u is included in the
participation constraint, for the risk neutrality, it can be canceled out.
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that the principal can never set wages such that the agent transfers more than
ω to her.
First, the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent, specifying
the base wage and the bonus for success; the agent accepts or rejects the offer;
conditional on accepting it, he decides how much effort to exert. Finally the
outcome is realized and the principal makes the transfer to the agent.
The maximization problem of the principal is given by:
max
e,a,b
− a+ p(e)[ξ − b] (1)
s.t. a+ p(e)b− c(e) ≥ u (PC)
e ∈ arg max
eˆ
{a+ p(eˆ)b− c(eˆ)} (IC)
a ≥ −ω (CC)
Equation (PC) is the participation constraint that ensures that the agent
will accept the contract proposed by the principal.8 Equation (IC) represents
the incentive compatibility constraint that ensures that the agent will choose
endogenously what the principal has chosen as optimal effort, and finally (CC)
represents the cash constraint. Usually in the literature (CC) is represented
as a ≥ 0 to model a cash-constrained agent, or in other words, a situation
with limited liability. In this article, instead, we allow for different levels of
wealth.
The solution to this problem depends on the value that ω takes. In fact,
it is well known in the moral hazard literature that if ω is high enough (and
this will be shown in the model as well), the principal can achieve first best
effort with a contract that is equivalent to selling up-front the outcome to the
agent.9 Doing so, he can extract the whole expected surplus, minus u.
When solving the problem not all the constraints are going to be binding.
If the (CC) is too severe, then the (PC) is not binding. Conversely if the
agent has large wealth, and/or a high reservation utility, one finds that only
the (PC) is binding. There are intermediate cases in which both constraints
are binding, and the solution is given by the system of equations provided by
the constraints of the problem. Because this model is quite standard in the
literature I leave its detailed derivation for Appendix A and directly present
the main results in Table 1. The utility of the principal is represented by v,
whereas the agent’s utility is represented by u.
8The participation constraint would be indeed ω+a+p(e)b−c(e) ≥ u+ω, as the agent’s utility
depends on his own wealth and on his outside option, but ω cancels out on both sides.
9First best refers to the situation in which there is no asymmetry of information between the
agent and the principal.
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Binding Constraint
Variable (CC) (CC) and (PC) (PC)
ω + u < ξ
2τ
8
ξ2τ
8
≤ ω + u ≤ ξ2τ
2
ξ2τ
2
< ω + u
e ξτ
2
√
(u+ ω)2τ ξτ
a −ω −ω u− ξ2τ
2
b ξ
2
√
(u+ω)2τ
τ
ξ
E[u] ξ
2τ
8
u+ ω u+ ω
E[∆u] −ω + ξ2τ
8
u u
E[v] ω + ξ
2τ
4
ξ
√
(u+ ω)2τ − 2u− ω ξ2τ
2
− u
∆ Surplus 3ξ
2τ
8
ξ
√
(u+ ω)2τ − u− ω ξ2τ
2
Table 1: Solution to problem in (1). ∆u and ∆ Surplus represent the induced
changes in both variables.
It can be immediately observed that when only (PC) is binding the first
best can be implemented, by selling the firm to the agent at his reservation
utility minus the expected surplus, and letting him keep the whole outcome
(b = ξ). The agent receives utility u and the implemented optimal level of
effort is ξτ . When only the (CC) is binding, the agent obtains information
rents, defined as whatever the agent obtains above his reservation utility. The
optimal effort is reduced to half when compared to the first best and the
surplus has dropped by 25%. What happens in between? The agent gets
utility u as the (PC) is binding, and also a = −ω, as the (CC) is binding.
Note that a lower value of ω implies an increase in the fixed wage that would
lead the agent to increase his utility; nevertheless, a decrease in ω leads also
to a decrease in the bonus and the implemented effort, keeping the agent at
his reservation utility level. The principal, though, is strictly worse off, as less
is being produced and she keeps a share of a smaller surplus.
The conclusions of this simple principal-agent model can be summarized
as:
1. The higher the agent’s wealth, the larger has to be the firm for him to
be considered cash-constrained.
2. If cash-constrained, the agent’s information rents decrease with his per-
sonal wealth.
3. The bigger the firm, the larger the set of agents that are to be considered
cash-constrained.
4. The larger the firm the (weakly) higher the bonus for the agent and the
expected utility for principal and agent, however the bonus is (weakly)
lower as a share of the firm’s profits.
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5. If the agent is not cash constrained the firm is indifferent as to the level
of agent’s wealth and the outcome is first best.
Baker and Hall (2004) finds, in an empirical work, that the size of the
bonus for the agent is smaller, as a percentage of the firm, the bigger the
firm. This is consistent with point 4. The model predicts that when the agent
is cash constrained, the bonus b is linear or constant on the firm’s size, and
therefore there is a decreasing relationship between the share of profits the
agent is keeping and the size of the firm.
We haven’t focused on the comparative statics of τ . However it is worth
mentioning that the results are in line with the findings in the literature
(Gabaix and Landier, 2008) in the sense that more talent leads to greater
compensation.
Two results are to be learned from this. First an agent would always like
to work for a firm in which he is cash constrained, as he can extract more
surplus. A good way to do that is to work in a big company, as this makes him
more cash-constrained, for a given ω, and also increases his expected utility,
as he is getting a share of a bigger surplus. On the other hand, a firm would
like to hire wealthy agents (or less cash-constrained or even better an agent
that is not cash-constrained at all), as then the principal can keep most or
all of the surplus. For the principal, how wealthy the agents needs to be for
her to be able to keep the whole surplus, depends on the size of the firm:
the smaller the firm, the less wealthy the agent needs to be, and therefore
smaller firms would be indifferent between less and more wealthy agents, as
long as both could buy the firm. The agent, however, will always look for
bigger firms to work for. This result is consistent with the findings of Dam
and Perez-Castrillo (2006).
3 The Utility Possibility Frontier and the
Matching
In this section we will study assortative matching between principals and
agents. In a broad sense we have assortative matching when the matching
between economic agents is determined by their types. For example, in our
case, a result of positive assortative matching (PAM) implies that wealthier
agents match with bigger firms. Negative assortative matching (NAM) means
exactly the opposite, i.e., that wealthier agents work in smaller firms. It is
useful to remind the reader at this point that I have defined u as the maximum
between 0 and the agent’s outside option. Now the outside market option is
going to be an input in the utility possibility frontier (UPF), and describes
how much utility the agent is obtaining with a particular contract.
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In the previous section, I provide arguments suggesting that PAM is a rea-
sonable matching outcome to expect when the agent’s type is wealth. When
the agent’s type is talent, it is considered standard in the literature that more
talented agents match with higher types of principals. Consistently with the
assumption in the previous section, that the principal makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the agent, I assume here that there are more agents than
principals.
It can be shown that the surplus of a match is supermodular, in the above
model, in the principal and agent’s types, which quite often is enough to
have PAM in a matching problem with transferable utility. However, in the
principal-agent setup, utility is not perfectly transferable. In a contract, the
principal can find many ways to transfer utility to the agent, and the case of
perfectly transferable utility would be simply a money transfer to the agent
(a higher fixed wage a). This is not an optimal alternative for the principal.
She will instead set a higher bonus b, incentivizing the agent to exert a higher
level of effort, and thus increasing the surplus. The transfer of utility to the
agent is financed in part by giving up a share of the surplus, but also by the
increase of it, so the utility loss for the principal is lower than the gains in
utility for the agent.
Legros and Newman (2007) [LN henceforward] introduced a methodology
to address the matching problem when utility is not perfectly transferable.
They consider a match between individuals type R and S. Let s > s′ and
r > r′ be two different types within each category, and the outcome be a match
between an individual from R with another individual from S. They argue
that r is going to match with s if r can outbid r′ for s. In particular, they
introduce the concept of generalized increasing differences (GID) which relies
on the utility possibility frontier (UPF) in order to determine the matching
between individuals. The UPF describes the combinations of utilities u and
v that are Pareto efficient.10 For the sake of consistency I will use the same
notation for the UPF, outlined in the following definition:
Definition 1. Let θ = (ω, τ) be the agent’s type, and ξ be the principal’s type.
The utility possibility frontier is described by the following functions:
• Let φ (ξ, θ, u) be the maximum utility that a principal type ξ can obtain
when matching with an agent of type θ, and this agent gets utility u.
• Let ψ (θ, ξ, v) be the maximum utility that an agent type θ can obtain
when matching with a principal of type ξ, and this principal gets utility
v.
Thus, φ and ψ represent the UPF from the points of view of the principal
10That is, neither principal nor agent can have higher utility without the other being worse off.
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and agent respectively, and for a bijective UPF and given types, one is the
inverse of the other, with respect to utility levels.
The main result in LN - that GID implies PAM - intuitively states that
the low type principal, for any level of utility he can get by matching with the
high type agent, will provide a certain utility level for each type of agent (high
or low type). In order for the high type principal to keep the high type agent,
she should be able to outbid the other principal, that is, to provide at least
as much utility to the high type agent as he would receive from the low type
principal. This will only occur if the principal gets more utility by providing
that utility to the high type agent than what she would get by giving the low
type agent what he gets from the low type principal. By doing this the high
type principal can outbid the low type principal and PAM will arise as the
market outcome.
In the model with only one principal and one agent, developed in section
3, it has been highlighted that, for the optimal contract, there are 3 possible
situations: only (CC) is binding, only (PC) is binding, or both (CC) and (PC)
are binding. The (IC) is always binding. From table 1, we can write down an
analogous table for the UPF (Table 2).
CC PC & CC PC
E[∆u] = ψ(ω, ξ, v) ξ
2τ
8
− ω u u
E[v] = φ(ξ, ω, u) ω + ξ
2τ
4
ξ
√
(u+ ω)2τ − 2u− ω ξ2τ
2
− u
Table 2: Utility Possibility Frontier.
The situation when only the (CC) is binding represents a single point on
the UPF. This happens because the agent is getting a fixed rent, and the (PC)
is not binding. If we want to move to the right along the UPF we need to
give higher utility to the agent, and then the (PC) starts binding. The (CC)
is binding until the unconditional transfer a implied by when only (PC) is
binding exceeds −ω (in other words, (CC) stops binding), leading to:
u− ξ
2τ
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
apc
≥ −ω︸︷︷︸
acc
(2)
or when looking at the UPF, when u ≥ ξ2τ/2 − ω. For all the values of
u ∈ [ξ2τ/8 − ω, ξ2τ/2 − ω], both constraints are binding. Of course the case
can appear in which ξ2τ/8 ≤ ω, or even ξ2τ/2 ≤ ω, nevertheless, as mentioned
earlier, I assume that the agent cannot obtain negative expected utility, and
therefore u ≥ 0. In particular for the UPF I assume that u = 0.
What is different to the usual UPFs is that this UPF’s domain varies
with ω, τ and ξ. For example, when ω is small, it considers values of u that
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are strictly positive. This represents a small variation with respect to LN’s
UPF, as they assume that its domain is between 0 and some upper bound for
both individuals. On the other hand, a bigger company, or a more talented
agent increases the expected value of the company, making an agent cash
constrained, and therefore creating information rents. To address this fact, I
define the following correspondences:
Definition 2. Given the UPF, define:
• uθ(ξ) := max{0, ξ
2τ
8 − ω} as the minimum level of utility that an agent
of type θ can get from a match with a principal of type ξ.
• Vξ(θ) := [0, φ (ξ, θ, uθ(ξ))] as the feasible utility levels that an optimal
contract can give to a principal whose firm has size ξ contracting with
an agent of type θ. By definition, Vξ(θ) is also the domain of ψ (θ, ξ, ·).
• Uξ(θ) := [uθ(ξ), ξ
2τ
2 ] as the set of feasible utility levels that an optimal
contract can give to an agent of type θ working for a firm of size ξ. By
definition, Uξ(θ) is also the domain of φ (ξ, θ, ·).
In Figure 1 I draw the UPF for different levels of ω. The upper dotted
line represents the surplus in the first best, whereas the lower dotted line
represents the surplus when only the (CC) binds. Both lines have a slope of
−1. In Figure 2 I repeat the same exercise but changing the value of τ instead.
The left and right solid points rest over the second and first best surplus
respectively. Specifically the left dot represents the contract in a second best
when only the CC is binding, whereas the right dot represents the principal
giving away the firm for free to the agent. The solid line represents sections
of the UPF when the principal has sold the firm to the agent in exchange of
some fixed fee. The dashed line represents the UPF when both constraints,
CC and PC, are binding.
By increasing the agent’s wealth, the UPF expands upward until it reaches
the first best surplus. As the utility for the agent increases, the principal
implements the contract indicated by the system of the three constraints CC,
PC, and IC. At the same time, the higher the utility for the agent, the more
relevant the PC becomes compared to the CC, and therefore the solution gets
closer to the first best outcome. Here, the principal is selling cheaper a share
in the outcome and therefore the agent, for the same price, is obtaining more
of the outcome, hence exerting more effort. If the agent has some wealth, the
principal will decide, once the agent is receiving a high amount of utility, just
to sell the whole firm for whatever wealth the agent has. By moving along
the UPF to the right, the principal will sell the firm cheaper, increasing the
utility received by the agent.
As the agent gets wealthier, the principal selling the firm to the agent
happens sooner in the UPF, that is, for lower values of ∆u. In the extreme
10
v|ξ
∆u|ω
ξ2τ
2
ξ2τ
8 − ω
ω + ξ
2τ
4
(a) ω = 0
v|ξ
∆u|ω
ξ2τ
8 − ω ξ2τ
2 − ω
ξ2τ
2
ω
ω + ξ
2τ
4
(b) ω ∈ [0, ξ2τ8 ]
v|ξ
∆u|ω
ξ2τ
2 − ω
ξ2τ
2
ω
ξ
√
2τω − ω
(c) ω ∈ [ ξ2τ8 , ξ
2τ
2 ]
v|ξ
∆u|ω
ξ2τ
2
ξ2τ
2
(d) ω ∈ [ ξ2τ2 ,∞)
Figure 1: UPF for different levels of ω.
v|ξ
ξ2τ
2
ξ2τ
2
(a) τ ∈
[
0, 2ω
ξ2
]
v|ξ
ξ2τ
2 − ω
ξ2τ
2
ω
(b) τ ∈
[
2ω
ξ2
, 8ω
ξ2
]
v|ξ
∆u|τ
ξ2τ
8 − ω
ω + ξ
2τ
4
ξ2τ
2 − ω
ξ2τ
2
ω
(c) τ ∈
[
8ω
ξ2
,∞
]
Figure 2: UPF for different levels of τ .
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case when the agent has enough wealth to pay the whole surplus, the principal
will be able to write the first best contract and extract the whole surplus.
On the other hand, when the agent has a fixed amount of wealth, increasing
his talent will cause the value of the firm, in first and second best outcomes, to
increase. This of course is good for both (the share he is receiving increases,
and the share of the principal increases as well), however there is a caveat.
The more valuable the firm is, the relative wealth, that is the amount of
wealth the agent has compared to the value of the firm (ξ), is decreasing, and
therefore the agent with more talent is relatively more affected by the CC than
a less talented agent. We can observe in Figure 2 how by increasing the level
of τ the agent moves from a situation in which he is unaffected by the cash
constraint, and therefore a first best outcome is always achieved, to another
in which he is considerably cash constrained, up to a point where information
rents are created. Let us start with a benchmark result.
Fact 1. If talent is homogeneous among the agents, and they are wealthy
enough such that they are not cash constrained for any firm, then nothing can
be said about how firms and agents are going to match.
Proof. If the poorest agent is rich enough to buy the biggest firm, the principal
will always set up a first best contract, and therefore will sell the firm exactly
at its surplus. For the agents, then, all the firms represent the same utility,
that is zero, and therefore are indifferent between them. For this reason, any
kind of matching can arise.
Fact 1 represents the simplest case, in which always first best contracts are
written and the principals are able to extract the whole surplus of their firms.
Putting this case out of the way, we can study more interesting situations.
In order to look for GID or PAM in this model, I will refer to Corollary 1
in LN, where they use the assumption that φ is twice differentiable to obtain
PAM, by looking at the signs of its second derivatives. There is a caveat
though: in our model φ is not twice differentiable. In Appendix B I discuss
that for LN’s corollary, it is enough for PAM that φ is differentiable in ξ,
and that this derivative is increasing in u and the agent’s type. These condi-
tions establish that the gains of a principal by matching with a higher type
counterpart are greater (a supermodularity condition) than when matching
with lower type counterparts, plus that for higher values of utility given to
the agent along the UPF, these gains also increase. This will ensure that the
high type principal can outbid the low type principal for the high type agent.
Lemma 1. The UPF described by φ (ξ, θ, u) is:
• Continuous and strictly decreasing in u for u ∈ Uξ(θ).
• Differentiable in u for u ∈ int(Uξ(θ)).
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• Differentiable in ξ.
Proof. To prove continuity it is enough to verify that φ
(
ξ, θ, ξ2τ/8− ω) =
ω + ξ2τ/4 and that φ
(
ξ, θ, ξ2τ/2− ω) = ω. Both are verified using simple
algebra.
Every piece of the UPF is differentiable in u. Therefore, it is sufficient to
verify that the derivatives coincide when the function changes its functional
form. At the first best surplus (and therefore in that section of the UPF) the
UPF has slope −1. The derivative of the UPF when PC and CC are binding
is (ξ
√
2τ(u+ ω))/(2(u + ω)) − 2. After replacing u = ξ2τ/2 − ω we obtain
−1, and then the UPF is differentiable in the interior of Uξ(θ). The part of
the UPF in which only the CC is binding is a point, and lies in the minimum
value of utility the agent can get from the matching, and therefore does not
belong to the interior of Uξ(θ).
Finally, as the function is continuous and every piece of it is strictly de-
creasing in u, the UPF is decreasing in u.
Now analyzing ∂φ/∂ξ, we need to study again its intervals. φ written as
a function of ξ is:
φ (ξ, θ, u) =

ξ2τ
2 − u if ξ ≤
√
2(u+ω)
τ
ξ
√
(u+ ω)2τ − 2u− ω if
√
2(u+ω)
τ < ξ ≤
√
8(u+ω)
τ
ξ2τ
4 + ω if ξ >
√
8(u+ω)
τ
Using simple algebra it can be shown that this function is continuous in ξ.
Moreover, taking the derivatives in each piece, and replacing the boundaries
of each piece of the function, it can also be verified to be differentiable in
ξ.
Lemma 1 is instrumental in the construction of the proof of the final
proposition. It says that the UPF is well behaved and follows a standard
principle: The more utility is given to the agent, the less utility the principal
will obtain.
Lemma 2. ∂φ/∂ξ is continuous and increasing in τ , ω, and u.
For the proof of Lemma 2 please refer to Appendix B. This is the first
stone to build up the supermodularity type of characteristics for φ in order to
obtain PAM. Further, it is necessary that φ does not decrease in the agent’s
type, nor ψ decrease in the principal’s type. This is formalized in the following
lemma,
Lemma 3. φ (ξ, θ, u) and ψ (θ, ξ, v) are type increasing, that is:
• φ is non decreasing in ω and τ .
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• ψ is non decreasing in ξ.
Proof. From Table 1 it can be seen that, at least piece-wise, both φ and ψ
are non decreasing in ω or τ the former, and ξ the latter. Continuity of φ and
ψ in each of the relevant variables, which is easily shown, is sufficient then to
obtain the type increasing property.
Lemma 3 shows that the surplus increases when increasing ω, τ , or ξ,
formalizing what can be observed in figures 1, 2, and 3 in which the UPF
shifts upward when increasing any of those parameters. This implies that for
any level of u that is feasible, the principal obtains at least as much utility
with a richer, or more talented agent.
v
∆u|ω
ξ
ξ′
Figure 3: ξ′ < ξ, ω ∈ [0, ξ˜2τ
8
] with ξ˜ ∈ {ξ′, ξ}
Proposition 1. The economy with principals and agents with moral hazard
satisfies generalized increasing differences in (ξ, ω) and (ξ, τ), which implies
that:
• For equally talented agents, larger firms will match with wealthier agents.
• For equally wealthy agents, larger firms will match with more talented
agents.
Proof. Given that the function φ is differentiable in ξ (Lemma 1), the fact
that Lemma 2 ensures that ∂φ/∂ξ is non decreasing in τ , ω, and u, and that
Lemma 3 shows that φ and ψ are type increasing, Corollary 1 in (Legros and
Newman, 2007, p.1097) can be applied, as the requirements for its proof are
satisfied, and therefore PAM is obtained for both matches. For a detailed
proof refer to Appendix B.
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Additional results with discrete types
Wealthier agents will work in bigger firms, and more talented agents will also
work in bigger firms. However, what is the equilibrium going to look like?
Finding how principals and agents will construct their contracts is not simple,
as an equilibrium would imply that everyone is maximizing their expected
utility by matching with their partner, and no other principal steals the agent
of another one. This means not only that the match is stable, which is implied
by GID, but that the contracts signed by each party can be clearly identified.
The conclusions of GID can be applied to a continuum of firms and agents,
as well as for a discrete set of them. For simplicity, I will focus in what is left
of this article on working with the discrete case.
Proposition 2. Let θ = (ω, τ) and θ′ = (ω′, τ ′) be the types of two consecutive
agents such that ω′ ≤ ω and τ ′ ≤ τ . One coordinate (τ or ω) is equal among
all the agents, whereas the other (ω or τ) is strictly larger. Let ξ′ < ξ bet the
sizes of two consecutive firms. The equilibrium outcome must satisfy:
• If (θ′, ξ′) represents the match of the lowest matching types, agent and
principal will obtain:
u∗ = uθ′(ξ
′)
v∗ = φ
(
ξ′, θ′, u∗
)
• Otherwise, let v˜ be the utility of the low type principal. The high type
match will obtain:
u∗ = max{ψ (θ, ξ′, v˜) , uθ(ξ)}
v∗ = φ (ξ, θ, u∗)
Proof. The first part of the proposition is trivial, as by GID no principal
would want to outbid the lowest type principal for the lowest type agent, and
therefore there are no incentives for the lowest type principal to provide more
utility than the minimum possible, that is uθ′(ξ
′).
For the second part, assume that u∗ = ψ (θ, ξ′, v˜). Note that if the high
type principal were to offer less than u∗, say u∗ − 2, then the low type
principal could offer u∗ −  and be strictly better off because the UFP is
strictly increasing in θ. By offering higher utility to the high type agent, she
outbids the high type principal for the high type agent. If u∗ = uθ(ξ), the same
reasoning applies, as it is sufficient that the high type principal offers enough
utility to the agent to avoid the outbidding from the low type principal.
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In a 2 by 2 world, that is two principals and two or more agents, the
low type match will write down a second best contract as if they were in an
isolated situation, whereas the high type match will write down a contract
that provides the agent at least as much utility as the high type agent would
obtain with the low type principal, when this principal is getting his second
best utility when matching with the low type agent, that is, when the low
type principal is unable to outbid the high type principal for the high type
agent.
Proposition 3. Consider consecutive matches of firms of size ξ′ < ξ, and
agents with types θ′ < θ, such that only ω or τ is equal for all the agents, and
for every match, the agents are cash constrained for both firms.
If difference in wealth or talent is large enough, i.e. if:
• ω−ω′ > τ
(
2ξ′4 + (ξ
2−ξ′2)
4 − ξ′2
√
ξ2 − ξ′2 + 4ξ′4
)
, when the agents’ type
is wealth.
• τ ′τ < 2− ξ
2
2ξ′2 , when the agents’ type is talent.
Then the high type match will write a contract with stronger incentives
than the contract it would write out of the market, and therefore closer to the
first best output.
Proof. Let ξ′ < ξ, ω′ ≤ ω and τ ′ ≤ τ with only one of these two last inequal-
ities being strict. Let v′ represent the utility the low type principal obtains
by matching with the low type agent, and assume both agents are cash con-
strained for both firms. From Proposition 2 we can write the maximum utility
the high type agent could get from the low type principal:
u =
1
4
(
−2(ω′ + ω) + ξ′2 τ + ∆τ
2
+ ξ′
√
τ(ξ′2∆τ + 4∆ω)
)
, (3)
where ∆ω = ω − ω′ and ∆τ = τ − τ ′. If the contract of the high type
match is equivalent to the one they would write out of the market, then the
high type agent would receive ξ2τ/8 − ω. The conditions in the proposition
come from comparing the utility level in (3) against this last expression.
Proposition 3 states the conditions such that the competitive pressure im-
posed by the market makes the high type match write a contract that provides
incentives in which the outcome is closer to the first best, compared to the ex-
pected outcome in the one-to-one version of the model, reflecting the efficiency
brought by competition into this economy. The first part of Proposition 3 says
that when the agents’ type is wealth, then the more talented they are, and
the more different in size are the firms, how much different wealth between
high and low type agents needs to be, in order for the competitive pressure
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to be enough to motivate the high type principal to strengthen the incentives
for the high type agent. Note that a bigger firm makes the agent more cash
constrained, increasing the information rents, and therefore decreasing the
need of more compensation to avoid outbidding from the low type principal
(as part of this cost is already covered by the higher information rents). This
explains, then, the necessary increase in the wealth of the high type agent
compared to the low type to have a contract that provides him more than the
information rents.
The second part of Proposition 3 says that when the agents’ type is talent,
and the size of the smaller firm is less than half of the size of the big one,
then for any relationship of talent between the agents, there is no competition
enough to make the high type principal to provide extra incentives to the
high type agent. However if ξ′ ≥ (√2/2)ξ, then for any pair τ ′ and τ the
contract written by the high types is going to give the high type agent more
information rents than what he would obtain with the high type principal in
the absence of market pressure.
The conclusions of Propositions 3 and 4 go in line with the literature, in the
sense that market pressure (competitive factors) can increase the difference
in expected compensation among the agents more than the difference in the
information rents created by the firm size.11 This would explain why concen-
trated distributions in talent, for example, can lead to dispersed distributions
of compensation as found by Tervio¨ (2008).
4 Wealth, Talent and the Matching
I have shown that the economy described in this work satisfies positive assor-
tative matching when the agent’s type is either talent or wealth. This suggests
that if talent and wealth are positively correlated, that is, more talented agents
have higher amounts of wealth, indeed positive assortative matching will arise.
However, there are situations in which this does not necessarily happen. In
particular, for young agents, their wealth is not correlated with their talent
but maybe their cash constraint is influenced by their networks or their family
wealth, so the question that remains is: Does positive assortative matching
with respect to talent holds for all joint distributions of the agents’ talent and
wealth?
The corporate finance literature (Tervio¨, 2008) considered positive assor-
tative matching between agents and principals when considering talent and
size as their types. I exploit the model introduced in this article to analyze the
impact that wealth can have on the matching between principals and agents.
In other words, are there distributions of wealth and talent among agents
11Because the agents are risk neutral, this is equivalent to gains in expected utility.
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that could compromise the PAM with respect to talent? Can wealthier but
poorly talented agents match with big firms at the same time that talented
and poorer agents end up working in small firms?
In Figure 4 we observe a graphical representation of the UPF to look for
GID or GDD,12 following Legros and Newman (2007). In detail, we compare
four possible matches: In the upper half of each vertical axis we consider the
big firm matching with the agents, whereas in the bottom half we consider
the small firm matching with the agents. The left half considers the poor but
talented agent matching with the firms, whereas the right half considers the
wealthier but not so skilled agent matching also with the firms as well. Each
axis represents the utilities of each actor, and the curves are the UPF derived
from each matching. For simplicity I assume that the poor agent has ω = 0,
whereas the rich agent has ω > 1, which ensures that he is cash unconstrained
with any firm.
We observe (Figure 4a) that when having a poor but skilled agent against
a rich but less capable agent we might no longer have PAM with respect to
talent and firm size. This happens when the difference in their talent is below
some threshold (τ − τ ′ < τ). Furthermore, if we start assuming a level v
as reservation profits for the firms, then we can even end up with negative
assortative matching when considering firm size and agent talent, if rich agents
have poor skills and poor agents are talented. Conversely, if the difference in
talent between the two agents is sufficiently high (Figure 4b), then the effect
of the limited liability becomes irrelevant, and positive assortative matching
between talent and firm size arises.
Note that where the UPF intersects the horizontal axis (the agent’s change
in utility) only changes with τ and ξ, whereas ω is crucial to determine where
the UPF reaches the maximum value for φ (the principal’s utility). Because
of this, if we analyze the matching between both of the agents, (ω,τ ′) and
(ω′,τ), with a firm of a given size, then the poorer agent will always have
the bottom of his UPF to the right of the UPF generated by the matching
of the wealthier one. However, if the difference in talent is small, the poorer
agent’s UPF will reach a lower maximum (the isolated second best contract
outcome) on the vertical axis than the UPF of the wealthier agent (the first
best outcome, of a slightly smaller outcome because of the lower talent). This
crossing of the UPFs is critical, as the firms prefer one agent or the other,
depending on how much utility they will have to provide to the agent in order
to make the matching stable. The UPFs will cross if and only if the difference
in talent is low enough.
12LN define generalized decreasing differences (GDD) as a sufficient condition for negative as-
sortative matching (NAM), where the lower type principal can outbid the high type principal for
the high type agent.
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∆u|(ω′, τ) ∆u|(ω, τ ′)
v|ξ′
v|ξ
(a) τ − τ ′ < τ .
∆u|(ω′, τ) ∆u|(ω, τ ′)
v|ξ′
v|ξ
(b) τ − τ ′ ≥ τ .
Figure 4: Assessment of the bidimensional matching between agents and principals.
5 Discussion
The model studied in this paper provides a simple framework to study the
implications of the matching between principals and agents, when we consider,
besides talent, the wealth owned by the agents. Doing that, on the one side
we obtain predictions for future empirical work, with a model that considers
the effects of endogenous matching. On the other, the model replicates some
empirical findings in the literature of executive compensation. In this section
I will expand on these two points.
Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006) takes the principal-agent model, with
moral hazard, into the matching framework. They conclude that market
conditions, such as competition for jobs or competition for workers, are crit-
ical to determine the market outcome. A key similarity with this work is
the consideration of wealth as the agent’s type, the consideration of non-
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perfectly-transferable utility between principal and agents, and the introduc-
tion of the effects of wealth through the limited liability channel. A key
difference, though, is that they consider homogeneous principals while I let
principals to differ in the size of their projects. I also let the agents have their
talent as another type. These differences allow to consider a much wider range
of scenarios, and instead of answering who is working (or who is hiring), they
allow to answer the question of who is working where. Letting talent be part
of the model, allows to contrast the conclusions with a wider set of empirical
literature, and check if there are crossed implications, as the agent’s could
have a multidimensional type.
Earlier, Legros and Newman (1996) set up a general equilibrium model
in which agents with different levels of wealth get together to form a firm.
They find that wealth plays a crucial role in defining the type of firms that
are going to be formed, in particular in the presence of moral hazard (when
monitoring costs are nontrivial).13 In this article, instead of studying firm
formation, I try to model the environment in which empirical compensation
studies are based on, such as, firms hiring executives. I do so, by letting the
market to be two-sided, differentiating firms from agents. Furthermore, in
the model presented in this article, agents are endowed with talent as well.
Both articles share, though, characteristics such as risk neutrality and wealth
playing a crucial role in the matching of agents through the limited liability
channel.
The empirical literature on compensation, has started to incorporate some
degrees of matching and moral hazard. Of particular relevance are the works
of Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio¨ (2008), which provide interesting
conclusions relating the variables that might drive the matching between ex-
ecutives and firms. Gabaix and Landier (2008) present a model of CEO and
firms matching, based on the distribution of the CEOs’ talent. They assume
that compensation is based on talent, while firms and CEOs are differenti-
ated between them in size and talent respectively. Their main theoretical
contribution is how compensation on talent reacts to the talent distribution,
reaching the conclusion (supported by their data) that even highly similar
talented CEOs can show big differences in their wages. They also conclude
that bigger firms lead to higher wages in equilibrium. Tervio¨ (2008) on the
other hand, develops a matching model that tries to obtain the distribution
of CEO’s ability from the known distribution of pay and firm’s market value.
The author concludes, among other important insights, that the wide differ-
13This market is closer to the one presented in Lucas (1978), in which the market is one-sided,
and economic agents might assume different roles in the resulting organizations. In a more recent
work Eeckhout and Kircher (2018) expands this matching concept by allowing the firm to choose
endogenously how many and how skilled are those workers.
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ences in compensation for a small distribution of CEO’s ability is given by
firms characteristics. It happens as well that competitive factors are crucial to
explain the huge differences in compensation levels among managers. Again,
Tervio¨ (2008) neglects moral hazard problems, and neglect any impact wealth
might have on the the design of incentives. An important lesson though is the
effects competition has in the level of wages. The model introduced in this
article provides a theoretical ground for these findings. The more similar the
agents and firms, the latter needs to pay more to keep the high type agents
agents, otherwise, smaller firms could outbid the bigger ones for them. This
competitive effect generates efficiency gains, which reflects in higher expected
surplus.
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) expands the framework of Gabaix
and Landier (2008), by incorporating the agency problems within a compet-
itive assignment model. They conclude that the compensation, as a share
of the firm, is decreasing in firm size, and they evaluate the effectiveness of
incentive compensation, a result that can also be replicated in the model intro-
duced in this article. Moreover, in their conclusions they raise a question that
relates directly with this article: Are CEO incentives increasing in wealth?
They refer to this problem and the impossibility to solve, at least empirically,
given that there is no information on absolute wealth for the CEO, and it
is only possible to obtain the wealth inside the firm, in terms of stocks and
options. This is one of the things that Baker and Hall (2004) tried to address.
They were trying to investigate the relationship between CEO’s compensation
with the firm’s size. To do this they developed a single and multitask agency
problem, and find the optimal compensation scheme for the CEO. They later
estimate their model focusing on understanding how the marginal effect of a
manager depends on the firm’s size. An interesting finding is that the CEO’s
bonus decreases, as a share of the company, with the firm’s size. They do not
use a matching model as the previous article, nevertheless this result is con-
firmed by the model presented in here. The authors use wealth to determine
the risk aversion only, given a firm size, and later make three assumptions
that allow them to proxy wealth in three different ways: first they assume
that wealth is proportional to total annual compensation, later they assume
that wealth is the CEO’s holding in the firm (options plus stock), and finally
they assume that CEOs of big firms aren’t richer nor poorer than CEOs of
smaller firms. For us, this is not the case, as the agent’s wealth is key to
determine 1) if the agent is cash constrained, and 2) if it is cash constrained,
how much information rents can the agent extract.
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6 Conclusions
The model developed here allows to understand some implications of the tra-
ditional moral hazard framework on the matching between principals and
agents. In particular I focus on the effect of the agent’s wealth on his rela-
tionship with firms of different size. I show that, with risk neutral principals
and agents, wealth makes the agent cash constrained for a lower amount of
firms (the smaller ones), and further, if he is not cash constrained, his infor-
mation rents decrease with his wealth, and increasingly so in the firm’s size.
Another result is that the size of the firm, measured in earnings, increases
both: agent and principal’s utility and compensation. Therefore a first con-
clusion is that the agent would prefer to work in big firms, for which he would
be cash constrained and therefore able to extract information rents. On the
other hand, firms prefer to hire wealthier agents, as this would allow them to
reduce the information rents the agent can extract from the surplus. This is
true only as long as the agent is cash constrained. This will happen for higher
levels of wealth, the higher size of the firm, or conversely, for a given size of
the firm, for lower levels of wealth. If the firm is small, the principal can do
just fine with poorer agents, as less wealth from their side is required to keep
them from being cash constrained.
In order to tackle the question of how principals and agents match, I adapt
the techniques developed in Legros and Newman (2007) and use generalized
increasing differences to obtain endogenous positive assortative matching be-
tween principals and agents when considering the firm’s size and the agent’s
wealth or talent. I also describe conditions on the parameter space to describe
the contract associated to each match, and its efficiency. In particular I find
that when types are closer, the market pressure is higher and makes the high
type match to set up a contract that creates a higher surplus than that which
could be obtained in a 1 to 1 situation. I also find that the lowest type will
always write a contract that is equivalent to an outside the market outcome,
when principals retain the bargaining power.
Finally I provide an example in which a poor agent with high talent,
and a wealthy agent with poor talent, match with firms of different size. I
find that if the difference in talent is small, then there will be no positive
assortative matching with respect to talent and firm size. However, if the
difference between the agents’ talent is sufficiently high, PAM is maintained.
Considering that wealth is not necessarily perfectly correlated with talent in a
sample with similar agents, this can be an issue for empirical considerations.
In particular, given that Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) has already shown
the negative impact that neglecting the matching considerations can have on
empirical results.
22
References
Ackerberg, D. A. and M. Botticini (2002). Endogenous matching and the em-
pirical determinants of contract form. Journal of Political Economy 110 (3),
564–591.
Baker, G. P. and B. J. Hall (2004). Ceo incentives and firm size. Journal of
Labor Economics 22 (4), 767–798.
Baker, G. P., M. C. Jensen, and K. J. Murphy (1988). Compensation and
incentives: Practice vs. theory. The Journal of Finance 43 (3), 593–616.
Bandiera, O., L. Guiso, A. Prat, and R. Sadun (2015). Matching firms, man-
agers, and incentives. Journal of Labor Economics 33 (3), 623–681.
Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2005). Contract Theory. The MIT Press.
Chade, H. and V. N. V. de Serio (2014). Wealth effects and agency costs.
Games and Economic Behavior 86, 1–11.
Dam, K. and D. Perez-Castrillo (2006). The principal-agent matching market.
Frontiers of Theoretical Economics 2 (1), 1–32.
Edmans, A., X. Gabaix, and A. Landier (2009). A multiplicative model of
optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium. The Review of Financial
Studies 22 (12), 4881–4917.
Eeckhout, J. and P. Kircher (2018). Assortative matching with large firms.
Econometrica 86 (1), 85–132.
Gabaix, X. and A. Landier (2008). Why has ceo pay increased so much? The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (1), 49–100.
Grossman, S. J. and O. D. Hart (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent
problem. Econometrica 51 (1), 7–45.
Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The
Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press.
Legros, P. and A. Newman (1996). Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory
of the organization. Journal of Economic Theory 70 (2), 312–341.
Legros, P. and A. Newman (2007). Beauty is a beast, frog is a prince: Assor-
tative matching with nontransferabilities. Econometrica 75 (4), 1073–1102.
Lucas, R. J. (1978). On the Size Distribution of Business Firms. The Bell
Journal of Economics 9 (2), 508–523.
23
Salanie´, B. (2005). The Economics of Contracts. The MIT Press.
Shetty, S. (1988). Limited liability, wealth differences and tenancy contracts
in agrarian economies. Journal of Development Economics 29 (1), 1–22.
Tervio¨, M. (2008). The difference that ceos make: An assignment model
approach. American Economic Review 98 (3), 642–668.
Thiele, H. and A. Wambach (1999). Wealth effects in the principal agent
model. Journal of Economic Theory 89 (2), 247–260.
A Derivation of the Partial Model
In this Appendix I provide the detailed steps to arrive from the maximization
problem of the principal in (1) to the results shown in Table 1.
Given the simplifying assumptions in the model, it is possible to solve the
problem by using the first order approach (as the agent’s problem has a unique
solution),14 the optimal e for the agent, given a pair of a and b is given by the
following condition:
p′(e)b = c′(e) or,
b =
c′(e)
p′(e)
(4)
Equation (4) implies that e = bτ . As expected, the amount of effort
exerted by the agent is increasing in the distance between the wage in the
good and bad state (in other words, the size of the bonus), as well as in the
level of his ability. We can replace then the first order condition (4) into the
other equations of the principal’s problem eliminating the variable b from it.
The new problem for the principal is:
max
e,a
− a+ e[ξ − c′(e)] (5)
s.t. a+ ec′(e)− c(e) ≥ u (PC.2)
a ≥ −ω (CC.2)
This reduced problem has a particular advantage. Besides having less vari-
ables to consider, it allow us to put the attention in the cash constraint for the
agent. In particular we are interested on how affected are the incentives when
14Grossman and Hart (1983) show how, under certain conditions, satisfied in this model, it
can be solved in two stages, first the agent’s problem, given the wages, and later the principal’s
problem.
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(CC.2) is relevant for the principal’s optimization. This will be the case as
long as (CC.2) is binding. We will proceed assuming that the agent is not cash
constrained, and solve the optimal compensation scheme. This is equivalent
to think that ω is big enough such that the a obtained by maximizing subject
to (PC.2) is higher than −ω. Later we will solve the problem considering the
opposite case, to finalize with the case in which both are binding.
Let ω be such that (CC.2) is not binding. From the new participation
constraint we obtain the minimum a that would make the agent sign the
contract. This a is given by:
a = u+ c(e)− ec′(e) = u− c(e)
The optimal a depends positively on the agent’s reservation utility but
negatively on effort. This is the most direct way in which we can observe
how the cash constraint (that forbids at some point decreasing a no matter
the level of e) impedes the principal to achieve an efficient outcome. The
optimal level for a can be replaced in the objective function for the principal’s
maximization problem described in (5) to end up with the following problem:
max
e
−u+ eξ − c(e)
Whose first order condition with respect to e is ξ = c′(e). This implies
that the marginal benefit of e should be equal to its marginal cost, which is
exactly the optimality condition in a first best situation. The solution should
satisfy e∗ = τξ. It should not be surprising to find that for higher values of
the output in the good state, the higher the contracted effort, as it happens
with the agent’s talent.
The wages set by the principal are a = u − ξ2τ2 and b = ξ. As stated
previously, the principal charges the expected surplus of the operation whereas
letting the agent keep the whole good outcome of the firm.
The expected utility for agent and principal are u+ω and ξ
2τ
2 −u (= −a)
respectively. This shows also that the agent, when not cash constrained, is un-
able to extract any information rents from the principal. This result is widely
known in the moral hazard literature. The principal therefore keeps the whole
surplus of the project, and she only needs to satisfy the agent’s reservation
utility. This is equivalent to a first best outcome, when the principal has full
knowledge of the agent’s actions.
To obtain these results, it is important to recall that we have assumed
that equation (CC.2) is not binding. Having an expression for a from the
participation constraint (CC.2), we can find a condition that indicates if either
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the participation constraint (PC.2) or the cash constraint (CC.2) is binding.
For equation (CC.2) not to be binding it must hold that:
u− ξ
2τ
2
> −ω (6)
From equation (6) we obtain already some conclusions. The higher the
agent’s reservation utility (u) and the agent’s wealth (ω), the less likely the
cash constraint (CC) is going to be binding. In the opposite direction, the
larger the size of the firm (ξ), the more likely the cash constraint is to be
binding.
Assume now that equation (CC.2) is binding. That implies immediately
that a = −ω, and given that equation (IC) hasn’t changed, b = c′(e). Replac-
ing that in the objective function, now the principal optimizes:
max
e
−(−ω) + e[ξ − c′(e)]
That yields as solution e∗ = τξ2 . It is direct to see how the optimal effort
has diminished. The optimal compensation scheme is now given by a = −ω
and b = ξ2 . The expected utility for the agent and the principal are
ξ2τ
8 and
ω + ξ
2τ
4 respectively.
An interesting result is that the agent’s expected utility is decreasing in
ω and increasing in ξ. Remember that the higher ω, the less possibilities has
the agent to extract information rents from the principal. Looking to the
principal, u˜p is increasing in both ω and ξ.
Finally there is the situation in which both constraints PC and CC are
binding (IC must always be binding with asymmetric information). In this
case, we determine the optimal level of effort without having to maximize the
principal’s utility, as this level is determined by the system of equations given
by the PC, CC and IC. We obtain that the implemented level of effort is:
e =
√
(u+ ω)2τ (7)
Equation (7) implies that e is increasing in ω, τ , and u. As the partici-
pation constraint is binding, the agent is still getting the expected utility u.
However, as a = −ω, a is decreasing in the agent’s wealth, and therefore the
effectively paid bonus should increase. As it can be observed, to implement
higher levels of effort it is necessary to have higher values of b as well. As con-
sequence the expected bonus increases in ω, compensating the agent for the
decrease in his fixed pay a and keeping his utility at u. Conversely, decreasing
the agent’s wealth implies a higher fixed wage a, and therefore for the agent to
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obtain his reservation utility, a lower bonus is required implementing a lower
level of effort. The principal suffers by having to implement lower levels of
effort (compared to first best) and paying a higher fixed compensation, de-
creasing her expected utility (as she is getting lower probability of receiving
ξ). The principal’s expected utility can be written as:
E[up|CC and PC binding] = ξ
√
(u+ ω)2τ − 2u− ω
It is very important to recall that when the CC is binding for the agent,
the PC must be satisfied, so the agent is always getting u or more. This
implies that the agent is always at least as good (always weakly better) when
he is cash constrained. On the opposite side, the principal is getting all the
surplus when the agent is not cash constrained.
B Proof of Proposition 1
In this Appendix I explore if the conditions which are sufficient to have gener-
alized increasing differences (GID) are satisfied by the principal-agent model
developed in the main text. The utility possibility frontier (UPF) generated
by the original model is found in Table 2. In this UPF E[v] represents the
utility obtained from the principal after signing the contract with the agent.
Each column represents the situation in which the agent is cash constrained,
but the participation constraint is not binding, when the cash constraint and
the participation constraint are both binding, and finally when only the par-
ticipation constraint is binding. The relation between the variables that define
in what situation we are, is given by the base wage determined when the agent
is not cash constrained, against his wealth. If the fixed part of the optimal
wage, assume an cash unconstrained agent, is lower than his minus wealth,
then the agent is not cash constrained. Then, the agent is cash constrained
if:
u− ξ
2τ
2
< −ω
This implies that the agent is not cash constrained if ξ ≥
√
2(u+ω)
τ , so
φ (ξ, θ, u) = ξ
2τ
2 − u if ξ ≥
√
2(u+ω)
τ . Note that this condition is equivalent to
u ≤ ξ2τ2 − ω when looked from the point of view of u.
With that, φ() can be written as:
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φ (ξ, θ, u) =

ξ2τ
2 − u if ξ ≤
√
2(u+ω)
τ
ξ
√
(u+ ω)2τ − 2u− ω if
√
2(u+ω)
τ < ξ ≤
√
8(u+ω)
τ
ξ2τ
4 + ω if ξ >
√
8(u+ω)
τ
Which is above written as a function of ξ. This function is continuous in
ξ. In order to be differentiable, let’s look at its derivatives:
∂φ (ξ, θ, u)
∂ξ
=

ξτ if ξ ≤
√
2(u+ω)
τ√
(u+ ω)2τ if
√
2(u+ω)
τ < ξ ≤
√
8(u+ω)
τ
ξτ
2 if ξ >
√
8(u+ω)
τ
The derivatives coincide in each interval, and therefore φ is differentiable
in ξ. It remains to answer if ∂φ/∂ξ is differentiable in u, ω, and τ .
B.1 ∂φ/∂ξ for (u+ ω)
∂φ(ξ, θ, u)
∂ξ
=

ξτ
2 if u+ ω <
ξ2τ
8√
(u+ ω)2τ if ξ
2τ
8 ≤ u+ ω < ξ
2τ
2
ξτ if u+ ω ≥ ξ2τ2
Which is continuous in u + ω. Derivatives with respect to u + ω in each
interval are 0, τ√
2
√
τ(u+ω)
, and 0 respectively. Evaluating in the extremes of
the interval it gives 2ξ and
1
ξ respectively. Therefore it is not differentiable in
u+ ω.
However, it is necessary that ∂φ/∂ξ is increasing in u which it is. As the
function is continuous, and increasing in u inside each interval, then ∂φ/∂ξ is
increasing in u+ ω, which implies that it is increasing in u and ω.
B.2 ∂φ/∂ξ for τ
∂φ (ξ, θ, u)
∂ξ
=

ξτ if τ ≤ 2(u+ω)
ξ2√
(u+ ω)2τ if 2(u+ω)
ξ2
< τ ≤ 8(u+ω)
ξ2
ξτ
2 if τ >
8(u+ω)
ξ2
Which is continuous in τ . The derivatives with respect to τ are: ξ,
u+ω√
2τ(u+ω)
, and ξτ respectively. All of them positive, and therefore ∂φ/∂ξ is
increasing in τ in each interval. This added to continuity gives that ∂φ/∂ξ is
increasing in τ .
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B.3 GID
The sufficiency conditions expressed in corollary 1 in Legros and Newman
(2007, p. 1083) are:
• For GID in ξ and ω,
∂2φ(ξ, θ, u)
∂ξ∂ω
≥ 0 and ∂
2φ(ξ, θ, u)
∂ξ∂u
≥ 0
• For GID in ξ and τ ,
∂2φ(ξ, θ, u)
∂ξ∂τ
≥ 0 and ∂
2φ(ξ, θ, u)
∂ξ∂u
≥ 0
In their proof, they use ∂2φ/∂ξ∂ω or ∂2φ/∂ξ∂τ to obtain that the deriva-
tive of φ with respect to ξ is increasing in the agent’s type and utility (Legros
and Newman, 2007, p.1097). Even though this function is not twice differen-
tiable in the model presented here, we have shown that it is increasing in all
the necessary variables and therefore the model in this economy satisfies GID
in ξ, ω and ξ, τ .
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